

# FISMA Evaluation

# EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT

Fiscal Year 2016
Report No. ER-17-01
October 2016

Federal Labor Relations Authority 1400 K Street, N.W. Suite 250, Washington, D.C. 20424

## **DEMBO JONES**

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS & ADVISORS

# **OIG**

**Evaluation Report** 

The Federal Labor Relations Authority Office of Inspector General

October 27, 2016

Carol Waller Pope Chairman

Dembo, Jones, Healy, Pennington & Marshall, P.C. (Dembo Jones), on behalf of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), conducted an independent evaluation of the quality and compliance of the FLRA security program with applicable Federal computer security laws and regulations. Dembo Jones' evaluation focused on FLRA's information security required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). This report was prepared in conjunction with the Inspector General (IG) and Dembo Jones. The weaknesses discussed in this report should be included in FLRA's Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 report to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress.

#### Results in Brief

During our FY 2016 evaluation, we noted that FLRA has taken steps to improve the information security program. We also noted that FLRA does take information security weaknesses seriously. FLRA took action to remediate several weaknesses within specific control areas.

This year's FISMA testing included a follow up of all prior year recommendations. There were a total of 11 prior recommendations, of which 5 are still open. There are no new findings.

#### **Background**

On December 17, 2002, the President signed into law, the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347). Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, commonly referred to as FISMA, focuses on improving oversight of Federal

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Evaluation of the FLRA's Compliance with the FISMA FY 2016 (Report No. ER-17-01)

information security programs and facilitating progress in correcting agency information security weaknesses. FISMA requires Federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program that provides security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. This program includes providing security for information systems provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source. FISMA assigns specific responsibilities to agency heads and IGs. It is supported by security policy promulgated through OMB, and risk-based standards and guidelines published in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) series.

Under FISMA, agency heads are responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems. FISMA directs Federal agencies to report annually to the OMB Director, Comptroller General, and selected congressional committees on the adequacy and effectiveness of agency information security policies, procedures, and practices and compliance with FISMA. In addition, FISMA requires agencies to have an annual independent evaluation performed of their information security programs and practices and to report the evaluation results to OMB. FISMA states that the independent evaluation is to be performed by the agency IG or an independent external auditor as determined by the IG. Implementing adequate information security controls is essential to ensuring an organization can effectively meet its mission. The IG plays an essential role in supporting Federal agencies in identifying areas for improvement. In support of that critical goal the FLRA supports the development of a strategy to secure the FLRA computing environment which centers on providing confidentially, integrity, and availability.

#### Scope and Methodology

The scope of our testing focused on the FLRA network General Support System, however the testing also included the others systems in the FLRA system inventory. We conducted our testing through inquiry of FLRA personnel, observation of activities, inspection of relevant documentation, and the performance of technical security testing. Some examples of our inquiries with FLRA management and personnel included, but were not limited to, reviewing System Security Plans (SSPs), access control, the risk assessments, and the configuration management processes.

Domko Jones, P.C.

Dembo, Jones, Healy, Pennington & Marshall, P.C.

Rockville, Maryland October 27, 2016

# Appendix 1 Prior Year Recommendations

#	Year Initiated	Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)	Open / Closed
1	2009	Develop a robust contingency planning program in accordance with NIST SP 800-53 Revision 3 Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems.	Closed
2	2011	<ul><li>Dembo Jones obtained the latest Contingency Plan, as well as inquired about contingency testing in the event of a disaster. The following was noted:</li><li>1. It was revealed that the latest Contingency Plan had not been signed or finalized.</li></ul>	Closed
3	2011	2. Furthermore, there have been no formalized tests of a contingency to be prepared in the event of a disaster.	Closed
4	2014	Each of the SSPs have documentation to addresses the NIST 800-53 Revision 4 controls (e.g. account management, vulnerability scanning, and authenticator management), however, not all of the control objectives for each control are addressed. Due to the SSPs not containing the detail required in accordance with NIST 800-53 Revision 4, the controls were not assessed. Furthermore, because there was no continuous monitoring in terms of periodic testing, POA&Ms were not completed timely or not completed at all.  1. Review all SSPs and ensure the documentation is clear and addresses each of the controls and all of their respective control objectives.	Closed
5	2014	2. All controls within NIST 800-53 Revision 4 for the systems' categorization should be used as a starting point for determining the assessments and implementation of a continuous monitoring program. Then, management should determine which of those controls are critical. Those critical controls should be assessed every year. The remainder of the controls should then be divided by three and then assessed over a three-year period, whereby 1/3 of the remaining controls are assessed each year. Ideally, the controls to be assessed each year should then be done on a quarterly basis by taking the annual set of controls and assessing ¼ each quarter. Upon completion of continuous monitoring, the agency should maintain metrics such as number of controls assessed on a monthly basis, number of deficiencies by family, etc.	Open
6	2014	3. Ensure any deficiencies as a result of the continuous monitoring assessments will be clearly and timely reported as a POA&M.	Open
7	2015	1. All vulnerabilities should be reviewed in terms of their risk classification (e.g. High, Medium, and Low). High vulnerabilities should be remediated within 1 business day and Medium vulnerabilities should be remediated within 3-5 business days. Documentation in these areas needs to be improved.	Open

#	Year Initiated	Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)	Open / Closed
8	2015	2. Any user that is terminated from the agency should have their access disabled within 5 business days. This needs to be documented to provide evidence that this is being done.	Open
9	2015	3. Incident Response prevention, detection and correction should be tested on an annual basis.	Closed
10	2015	4. All Users" access rights upon initiation should have their access rights reviewed, approved, and subsequently maintained for audit purposes.	Closed
11	2015	5. On an annual basis, all FLRA employees should have their access reviewed to ensure it still commensurate with their job functions. Consider having supervisors across the FLRA assist in this review of employees in their departments and provide the IT with the analysis.	Open



#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

1400 K STREET N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20424

WWW.FLRA.gov

October 25, 2016

#### MEMORANDUM

TO:

Dana Rooney-Fisher

Inspector General

FROM:

Sarah Whittle Spooner

Executive Director VC

SUBJECT:

Follow-up Response and Action Plan Regarding Compliance with the Federal

Information Security Management Act (FISMA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Report

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a follow-up memo addressing the FISMA FY16 Report. Please find attached the Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) that was developed in response to the Report. Plans have been developed for mitigating the vulnerabilities and are expected to be corrected by March 2017.

We look forward to continuing to work with you on addressing and resolving any outstanding matters.

	Finding	Management Response	Comment
	Develop a robust contingency planning program in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision	Completed and signed the Agency information technology continuity of	Corrective Fimeli
	3 Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems .	operations plan (COOP).	
	2	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
	The organization: (i) does not test and/or exercise the contingency plan for the information system		
	[Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually] using [Assignment: organization-defined test	s	
	and/or exercises) to determine the plan's effectiveness and the organization's readiness to execute the plan-	1	
1	and (ii) does not review the contingency plan test/exercise results and does not initiate corrective actions		Closed
			Cibsed
	The organization does not identify an alternate processing site and does not initiate necessary agreements to		
	permit the resumption of information system operations for critical mission/business functions within		
	[Assignment: organization-defined time period] when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable.		ľ
	(A) (4) COMMON (A) COMMON COMMON (A) COMMON		
	Danks (see a start of the later		
	Dembo Jones obtained the latest Contingency Plan, as well as inquired about contingency testing in the even of a disaster. The following was noted:	See finding #1 - FLRA established an IT COOP plan and tested accordingly.	
2	or a disaster. The following was flored:		Closed
	1. It was revealed that the latest Contingency Plan had not been signed or finalized.		Closed
	Continuous Monitoring / Security Plans	IDAGO (L. d.s. C.). COD.	
		IRMD Updated its SSP and took necessary steps to implement continuous	
	Dembo Jones reviewed the System Security Plans (SSPs) and Security Controls Assessments (SCAs) for all	monitoring.	
	systems in scope and noted the following:		
3	1 - Each of the SSPs have documentation to addresses the NIST 800-53 Revision 4 controls (e.g. account		
3	management, vulnerability scanning, and authenticator management), however, not all of the control		Closed
	objectives for each control are addressed.	1	
	2 - Due to the SSPs not containing the detail required in accordance with NIST 800-53 Revision 4, the controls	t t	
	were not assessed.		
	Timely Remediation of Vulnerabilities	The FLRA takes the remediation of vulnerabilities seriously and has	
		committed to NIST 800-53. Revision 4 RA-5. While yulperabilities were	
	Scan results were reviewed over a two week period to assess the timely remediation of any Medium and High	remediated in accordance with this guideline, as noted by the auditor,	
4	vulnerabilities. Upon review of those scan results, we were unable to discern a total list of Low, Medium, and	the documentation of said remediation was lacking. The FLRA intends to	Spring 2017
	High risks, as well as how long it took to remediate those deficiencies. As a result, the condition is that	implement a more stringent documentation policy of all steps taken to	
	deficiencies are not remediated in a timely manner.	remediate vulnerabilities in a timely manner.	
	Personnel Termination		
		Upon termination, the FLRA takes many steps to ensure account access	
5	Upon review of the users that were terminated from the agency, it was not discernable how many days it	and Agency owned assets are dealt with appropriately. The FLRA will	Spring 2017
	took to remove the users' access after their respective termination date.	update its policy and documentation showing the actions taken.	
	Upon review of Incident Response planning and testing; the following was noted:	The FLRA finalized its Incident Response Plan and all IT personnel	
		participated in all aspects of Incident Response planning, testing, and	
6	There is no testing of the current incidence response environment	training as coordinated by the FLRA's Information Systems Security	
- 1		Manager.	Closed
	There is no training provided to the IT staff with respect to preparing for and managing incidents		
	a providents	1	
	Access Authorization	While the FLRA did perform the necessary audits and permission	
	Access Authorization	While the FLRA did perform the necessary audits and permission confirmation practices, the processes were not properly documented.	
	Access Authorization  Jpon review of a sample of a set of users for assessing their access authorizations; the following was noted:	confirmation practices, the processes were not properly documented.	
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# Inspector General

Section Report

2016
Annual HSMA
Report

#### Federal Labor Relations Authority

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#### Section 0: Overall

Please provide an overall narrative assessment of the agency's information security program. Please note that OMB will include this information in the publicly available Annual FISMA Report to Congress to provide additional context for the Inspector General's effectiveness rating of the agency's information security program. OMB may modify this response to conform with the grammatical and narrative structure of the Annual Report.

This agency has a robust security program with regular scanning, as well as a host of both physical and logical security controls.

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Section	n 1: Id	entify	
Risk M	anagem	ent (Identify)	
1.1	Has th with F Met	e organization established a risk management program that includes comprehensive agency policies and procedures consistent ISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines?	Defined
	1,1.1	Identifies and maintains an up-to-date system inventory, including organization- and contractor-operated systems, hosting environments, and systems residing in the public, hybrid, or private cloud. (2016 CIO FISMA Metrics, 1.1; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CF) ID AM.1, NIST 800-53: PM-5)  Met	Defined
	1.1.2	Develops a risk management function that is demonstrated through the development, implementation, and maintenance of a comprehensive governance structure and organization-wide risk management strategy as described in NIST SP 800-37, Rev. 1. (NIST SP 800-39)  Met	Consistently Implemented
	1.1.3	Incorporates mission and business process-related risks into risk-based decisions at the organizational perspective, as described in NIST SP 800-37, Rev. 1. (NIST SP 800-39)  Met	Consistently Implemented
	1.1.4	Conducts information system level risk assessments that integrate risk decisions from the organizational and mission/business process perspectives and take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, impact, and risks from external parties and common control providers. (NIST SP 800-37, Rev. 1, NIST SP 800-39, NIST SP 800-53: RA-3)  Met	Consistently Implemented
	I.1.5	Provides timely communication of specific risks at the information system, mission/business, and organization-level to appropriate levels of the organization.  Met	Managed and Measureable
	1.1.6	Performs comprehensive assessments to categorize information systems in accordance with Federal standards and applicable guidance. (FIPS 199, FIPS 200, FISMA, Cybersecurity Sprint, OMB M-16-04, President's Management Council (PMC) cybersecurity assessments)  Met	Consistently Implemented

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n 1: 1d	entify	
1.1.7	Selects an appropriately tailored set of baseline security controls based on mission/business requirements and policies and develops procedures to employ controls within the information system and its environment of operation.  Met	Defined
1.1.8	Implements the tailored set of baseline security controls as described in 1.1.7.  Met	Consistenti Implement
1.1.9	Identifies and manages risks with system interconnections, including through authorizing system interconnections, documenting interface characteristics and security requirements, and maintaining interconnection security agreements. (NIST SP 800-53: CA-3)  Met	Managed an Measureab
1.1.10	Continuously assesses the security controls, including hybrid and shared controls, using appropriate assessment procedures to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system.  Not Met	Consistently Implemente
	Comments: The controls from NIST 800-53 are assessed, however they were not assessed on a quarterly basis covering controls over a 3 year period.	all of the
I.1.11	Maintains ongoing information system authorizations based on a determination of the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the operation of the information system and the decision that this risk is acceptable (OMB M-14-03, NIST Supplemental Guidance on Ongoing Authorization).  Met	Managed an Measureabl
1.1.12	Security authorization package contains system security plan, security assessment report, and POA&M that are prepared and maintained in accordance with government policies. (SP 800-18, SP 800-37)  Met	Managed an Measureabl
1.1.13	POA&Ms are maintained and reviewed to ensure they are effective for correcting security weaknesses.	Consistently Implemente

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#### For Official Use Only Section 1: Identify 1.1.14 Centrally tracks, maintains, and independently reviews/validates POA&M activities at least quarterly. (NIST SP 800-53 Managed and CA-5; OMB M-04-25) Measureable Met 1.1.15 Prescribes the active involvement of information system owners and common control providers, chief information officers, Managed and senior information security officers, authorizing officials, and other roles as applicable in the ongoing management of Measureable information-system-related security risks. 1.1.16 Implemented an insider threat detection and prevention program, including the development of comprehensive policies, Consistently procedures, guidance, and governance structures, in accordance with Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Implemented Threat Policy. (PMC; NIST SP 800-53: PM-12) 1.1.17 Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization's Risk Management program that was not noted in the questions above. Based on all testing performed, is the Risk Management program effective? Effective Contractor Systems (Identify) Has the organization established a program to oversee systems operated on its behalf by contractors or other entities, including other Defined government agencies, managed hosting environments, and systems and services residing in a cloud external to the organization that is inclusive of policies and procedures consistent with FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines? Met 1.2.1 Establishes and implements a process to ensure that contracts/statements of work/solicitations for systems and services, Consistently include appropriate information security and privacy requirements and material disclosures, FAR clauses, and clauses on Implemented protection, detection, and reporting of information. (FAR Case 2007-004, Common Security Configurations, FAR Sections 24.104, 39.101, 39.105, 39.106, 52.239-1, PMC, 2016 CIO Metrics 1.8, NIST 800-53, SA-4 FedRAMP standard contract clauses; Cloud Computing Contract Best Practices) Met

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#### Section 1: Identify

1.2.2 Specifies within appropriate agreements how information security performance is measured, reported, and monitored on contractor- or other entity-operated systems. (CIO and CAO Council Best Practices Guide for Acquiring IT as a Service, NIST SP 800-35)

Consistently Implemented

Met

Obtains sufficient assurance that the security controls of systems operated on the organization's behalf by contractors or other entities and services provided on the organization's behalf meet FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines. (NIST SP 800-53: CA-2, SA-9)

Consistently Implemented

Met

1.2.4 Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization's Contractor Systems Program that was not noted in the questions above. Based on all testing performed, is the Contractor Systems Program effective?

Effective

Level	Score	Possible Score
LEVEL 3: Consistently Implemented	13	20
,,,,,	13	

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Section	on 2: Pr	otect	
Config	guration	Management (Protect)	
2.1	Has the proceed Met	e organization established a configuration management program that is inclusive of comprehensive agency policies and lures consistent with FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines?	Defined
	2.1.1	Develops and maintains an up-to-date inventory of the hardware assets (i.e., endpoints, mobile assets, network devices, input/output assets, and SMART/NEST devices) connected to the organization's network with the detailed information necessary for tracking and reporting. (NIST CF ID.AM-1; 2016 CIO FISMA Metrics 1.5, 3.17; NIST 800-53; CM-8) Met	Defined
	2.1.2	Develops and maintains an up-to-date inventory of software platforms and applications used within the organization and with the detailed information necessary for tracking and reporting. (NIST 800-53: CM-8, NIST CF ID.AM-2)  Met	Defined
	2.1.3	Implements baseline configurations for IT systems that are developed and maintained in accordance with documented procedures. (NIST SP 800-53: CM-2; NIST CF PR.IP-1)  Met	Consistently Implemented
	2.1.4	Implements and maintains standard security settings (also referred to as security configuration checklists or hardening guides) for IT systems in accordance with documented procedures. (NIST SP 800-53: CM-6; CIO 2016 FISMA Metrics, 2.3)  Met	Consistently Implemented
	2.1.5	Assesses configuration change control processes, including processes to manage configuration deviations across the enterprise that are implemented and maintained. (NIST SP 800-53: CM-3, NIST CF PR.IP-3)  Met	Managed and Measureable
	2.1.6	Identifies and documents deviations from configuration settings. Acceptable deviations are approved with business justification and risk acceptance. Where appropriate, automated means that enforce and redeploy configuration settings to systems at regularly scheduled intervals are deployed, while evidence of deviations is also maintained. (NIST SP 800-53: CM-6, Center for Internet Security Controls (CIS) 3.7)  Met	Managed and Measureable

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#### Section 2: Protect Implemented SCAP certified software assessing (scanning) capabilities against all systems on the network to assess both Managed and code-based and configuration-based vulnerabilities in accordance with risk management decisions. (NIST SP 800-53: Measureable RA-5, SI-2; CIO 2016 FISMA Metrics 2.2, CIS 4.1) 2.1.8 Remediates configuration-related vulnerabilities, including scan findings, in a timely manner as specified in organization policy Consistently or standards. (NIST 800-53: CM-4, CM-6, RA-5, SI-2) Implemented 2.1.9 Develops and implements a patch management process in accordance with organization policy or standards, including timely Managed and and secure installation of software patches. (NIST SP 800-53: CM-3, SI-2, OMB M-16-04, DHS Binding Operational Measureable Directive 15-01) 2.1.10 Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization's Configuration Management Program that was not noted in the questions above. Based on all testing performed, is the Configuration Management Program effective? Effective Identity and Access Management (Protect) Has the organization established an identity and access management program, including policies and procedures consistent with Defined FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines? Met 2.2.1 Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information systems sign appropriate access Consistently agreements, participate in required training prior to being granted access, and recertify access agreements on a Implemented predetermined interval. (NIST 800-53: PL-4, PS-6) 2.2.2 Ensures that all users are only granted access based on least privilege and separation-of-duties principles. Consistently Implemented Not Met Comments: Users access rights were not reviewed on an annual basis.

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ion 2: Pr	ptect	
2.2.3	Distinguishes hardware assets that have user accounts (e.g., desktops, laptops, servers) from those without user accounts (e.g. networking devices, such as load balancers and intrusion detection/prevention systems, and other input/output devices such as faxes and IP phones).  Met	Consistently Implemented
2.2.4	Implements PIV for physical access in accordance with government policies. (HSPD 12, FIPS 201, OMB M-05-24, OMB M-07-06, OMB M-08-01, OMB M-11-11)  Met	Consistently Implemented
2.2.5	Implements PIV or a NIST Level of Assurance (LOA) 4 credential for logical access by all privileged users (system, network, database administrators, and others responsible for system/application control, monitoring, or administration functions). (Cybersecurity Sprint, OMB M-16-04, PMC, 2016 CIO FISMA Metrics 2.5.1)  Met	Consistently Implemented
2.2.6	Enforces PIV or a NIST LOA 4 credential for logical access for at least 85% of non-privileged users. (Cybersecurity Sprint, OMB M-16-04, PMC, 2016 CIO FISMA Metrics 2.4.1)  Met	Consistently Implemented
2.2.7	Tracks and controls the use of administrative privileges and ensures that these privileges are periodically reviewed and adjusted in accordance with organizationally defined timeframes. (2016 CIO FISMA Metrics 2.9, 2.10; OMB M-16-04, CIS 5.2)  Met	Managed and Measureable
2.2.8	Ensures that accounts are terminated or deactivated once access is no longer required or after a period of inactivity, according to organizational policy.  Not Met	Managed and Measureable
	Comments: There were users that were terminated where their access was not removed within a timely manner.	
2.2.9	Identifies, limits, and controls the use of shared accounts (NIST SP 800-53: AC-2)  Met	Consistently Implemented

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Met

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#### Section 2: Protect All users are uniquely identified and authenticated for remote access using Strong Authentication (multi-factor), including Consistently PIV. (NIST SP 800-46, Section 4.2, Section 5.1, NIST SP 800-63) Implemented Met 2.2.11 Protects against and detects unauthorized remote access connections or subversion of authorized remote access Consistently connections, including through remote scanning of host devices. (CIS 12.7, 12.8, FY 2016 CIO FISMA metrics 2.17.3, Implemented 2.17.4, 3.11, 3.11.1) Met 2.2.12 Remote access sessions are timed-out after 30 minutes of inactivity, requiring user re-authentication, consistent with OMB Managed and M-07-16 Measureable Met 2.2.13 Enforces a limit of consecutive invalid remote access logon attempts and automatically locks the account or delays the next Consistently logon prompt. (NIST 800-53: AC-7) Implemented 2.2.14 Implements a risk-based approach to ensure that all agency public websites and services are accessible through a secure Consistently connection through the use and enforcement of https and strict transport security. (OMB M-15-13) Implemented 2.2.15 Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization's Identity and Access Management Program that was not noted in the questions above. Based on all testing performed is the Identity and Access Management Program effective? Effective Security and Privacy Training (Protect) Has the organization established a security and privacy awareness and training program, including comprehensive agency policies and Defined procedures consistent with FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines? Met

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2.3

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#### For Official Use Only Section 2: Protect Develops training material for security and privacy awareness training containing appropriate content for the organization, Consistently including anti-phishing, malware defense, social engineering, and insider threat topics. (NIST SP 800-50, 800-53: AR-5, Implemented OMB M-15-01, 2016 CIO Metrics, PMC, National Insider Threat Policy (NITP)) Evaluates the skills of individuals with significant security and privacy responsibilities and provides additional security and Consistently privacy training content or implements human capital strategies to close identified gaps. (NIST SP 800-50) Implemented Identifies and tracks status of security and privacy awareness training for all information system users (including employees, Consistently contractors, and other organization users) requiring security awareness training with appropriate internal processes to detect Implemented and correct deficiencies. (NIST 800-53: AT-2) 2.3.4 Identifies and tracks status of specialized security and privacy training for all personnel (including employees, contractors, Consistently and other organization users) with significant information security and privacy responsibilities requiring specialized training Implemented 2.3.5 Measures the effectiveness of its security and privacy awareness and training programs, including through social engineering Managed and and phishing exercises. (PMC, 2016 CIO FISMA Metrics 2.19, NIST SP 800-50, NIST SP 800-55) Measureable Met 2.3.6 Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization's Security and Privacy Training Program that was not noted in the questions above. Based on all testing performed is the Security and Privacy Training Program effective? Effective

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#### Section 3: Detect

#### Level 1

#### Definition

3.1.1 ISCM program is not formalized and ISCM activities are performed in a reactive manner resulting in an ad hoc program that does not meet Level 2 requirements for a defined program consistent with NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-137, OMB M-14-03, and the CIO ISCM CONOPS

#### People

3.1.1.1 ISCM stakeholders and their responsibilities have not been fully defined and communicated across the organization.

Ad Hoc

3.1 1.2 The organization has not performed an assessment of the skills, knowledge, and resources needed to effectively implement an ISCM program. Key personnel do not possess knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully implement an effective ISCM program.

Ad Hoc

3.1.1.3 The organization has not defined how ISCM information will be shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities and used to make risk based decisions.

Ad Hoc

Met

Ad Hoc

3.1.1.4 The organization has not defined how it will integrate ISCM activities with organizational risk tolerance, the threat environment, and business/mission requirements.
Met

#### Processes

3.1.1.5 ISCM processes have not been fully defined and are performed in an ad-hoc, reactive manner for the following areas: ongoing assessments and monitoring of security controls; performing hardware asset management, software asset management, configuration setting management, and common vulnerability management; collecting security related information required for metrics, assessments, and reporting; analyzing ISCM data, reporting findings, and determining the appropriate risk responses; and reviewing and updating the ISCM program.

Ad Hoc

Met

3.1.1.6 ISCM results vary depending on who performs the activity, when it is performed, and the methods and tools used.
Met

Ad Hoc

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#### Section 3: Detect The organization has not identified and defined the qualitative and quantitative performance measures that will be used to assess the Ad Hoc effectiveness of its ISCM program, achieve situational awareness, and control ongoing risk. 3.1.1.8 The organization has not defined its processes for collecting and considering lessons learned to improve ISCM processes. Ad Hoc Technology 3.1.1.9 The organization has not identified and defined the ISCM technologies needed in one or more of the following automation areas and Ad Hoc relies on manual/procedural methods in instances where automation would be more effective. Use of ISCM technologies in the following areas is ad-hoc. - Patch management - License management - Information management - Software assurance - Vulnerability management - Event management - Malware detection - Asset management - Configuration management - Network management - Incident management Met 3.1.1.10 The organization has not defined how it will use automation to produce an accurate point-in-time inventory of the authorized and Ad Hoc unauthorized devices and software on its network and the security configuration of these devices and software. Met Level 2 Definition OIG Report - Annual 2016 Page 12 of 33 For Official Use Only

#### Section 3: Detect

3.2.1 The organization has formalized its ISCM program through the development of comprehensive ISCM policies, procedures, and strategies consistent with NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-137, OMB M-14-03, and the CIO ISCM CONOPS. However, ISCM policies, procedures, and strategies are not consistently implemented organization-wide.

#### People

3.2.1.1 ISCM stakeholders and their responsibilities have been defined and communicated across the organization. However, stakeholders may not have adequate resources (people, processes, and technology) to effectively implement ISCM activities.
Met

Defined

3.2.1.2 The organization has performed an assessment of the skills, knowledge, and resources needed to effectively implement an ISCM program. In addition, the organization has developed a plan for closing any gaps identified. However, key personnel may still lack the knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully implement an effective ISCM program.

Defined

M

3.2.1.3 The organization has defined how ISCM information will be shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities and used to make risk-based decisions. However, ISCM information is not always shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities in a timely manner with which to make risk-based decisions.

Defined

Met

3.2.1.4 The organization has defined how it will integrate ISCM activities with organizational risk tolerance, the threat environment, and business/mission requirements. However, ISCM activities are not consistently integrated with the organization's risk management program.

Defined

Met

#### Processes

3.2.1.5 ISCM processes have been fully defined for the following areas: ongoing assessments and monitoring of security controls; performing hardware asset management, software asset management, configuration setting management, and common vulnerability management; collecting security related information required for metrics, assessments, and reporting; analyzing ISCM data, reporting findings, and determining the appropriate risk responses; and reviewing and updating the ISCM program. However, these processes are inconsistently implemented across the organization.

Defined

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#### Section 3: Detect 3.2.1.6 ISCM results vary depending on who performs the activity, when it is performed, and the methods and tools used. Defined 3.2.1.7 The organization has identified and defined the performance measures and requirements that will be used to assess the effectiveness Defined of its ISCM program, achieve situational awareness, and control ongoing risk. However, these measures are not consistently collected, analyzed, and used across the organization. The organization has a defined process for capturing lessons learned on the effectiveness of its ISCM program and making necessary 3.2.1.8 Defined improvements However, lessons learned are not consistently shared across the organization and used to make timely improvements to the ISCM program. Met Technology 3.2.1.9 The organization has identified and fully defined the ISCM technologies it plans to utilize in the following automation areas. In Defined addition, the organization has developed a plan for implementing ISCM technologies in these areas: patch management, license management, information management, software assurance, vulnerability management, event management, malware detection, asset management, configuration management, network management, and incident management. However, the organization has not fully implemented technology is these automation areas and continues to rely on manual/procedural methods in instances where automation would be more effective. In addition, while automated tools are implemented to support some ISCM activities, the tools may not be interoperable Met 3.2.1.10 The organization has defined how it will use automation to produce an accurate point-in-time inventory of the authorized and Defined unauthorized devices and software on its network and the security configuration of these devices and software. However, the organization does not consistently implement the technologies that will enable it to manage an accurate point-in-time inventory of the authorized and unauthorized devices and software on its network and the security configuration of these devices and software. Met Level 3 Definition OIG Report - Annual 2016 Page 14 of 33

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#### Section 3: Detect

3.3.1 In addition to the formalization and definition of its ISCM program (Level 2), the organization consistently implements its ISCM program across the agency. However, qualitative and quantitative measures and data on the effectiveness of the ISCM program across the organization are not captured and utilized to make risk-based decisions, consistent with NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-137, OMB M-14-03, and the CIO ISCM CONOPS

#### People

3.3.1.1 ISCM stakeholders and their responsibilities have been identified and communicated across the organization, and stakeholders have adequate resources (people, processes, and technology) to effectively implement ISCM activities
Met

Consistently Implemented

3.3.1.2 The organization has fully implemented its plans to close any gapes in skills, knowledge, and resources required to successfully implement an ISCM program. Personnel possess the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to effectively implement the organization's ISCM program.

Consistently Implemented

Met

3.3.1.3 ISCM information is shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities in a consistent and timely manner with which to make risk-based decisions and support ongoing system authorizations.
Met

Consistently Implemented

3.3.1.4 ISCM activities are fully integrated with organizational risk tolerance, the threat environment, and business/mission requirements.

Consistently Implemented

Met

#### Processes

3.3.1.5 ISCM processes are consistently performed across the organization in the following areas: ongoing assessments and monitoring of security controls; performing hardware asset management, software asset management, configuration setting management, and common vulnerability management; collecting security related information required for metrics, assessments, and reporting; analyzing ISCM data, reporting findings, and determining the appropriate risk responses, and reviewing and updating the ISCM program.
Met

Consistently Implemented

3.3.1.6 The rigor, intensity, scope, and results of ISCM activities are comparable and predictable across the organization.

Consistently Implemented

Met

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#### For Official Use Only Section 3: Detect The organization is consistently capturing qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the performance of its ISCM program Consistently in accordance with established requirements for data collection, storage, analysis, retrieval, and reporting. ISCM measures provide Implemented information on the effectiveness of ISCM processes and activities 3.3.1.8 The organization is consistently capturing and sharing lessons learned on the effectiveness of ISCM processes and activities. Lessons Consistently learned serve as a key input to making regular updates to ISCM processes Implemented 3.3.1.9 The organization has consistently implemented its defined technologies in all of the following ISCM automation areas. ISCM tools are Consistently interoperable to the extent practicable Implemented - Patch management - License management - Information management - Software assurance - Vulnerability management - Event management - Malware detection - Asset management - Configuration management - Network management - Incident management Met Technology 3.3.1.10 The organization can produce an accurate point-in-time inventory of the authorized and unauthorized devices and software on its Consistently network and the security configuration of these devices and software. Implemented Met Level 4 Definition OIG Report - Annual 2016 Page 16 of 33 For Official Use Only

#### Section 3: Detect

In addition to being consistently implemented (Level 3), ISCM activities are repeatable and metrics are used to measure and manage the implementation of the ISCM program, achieve situational awareness, control ongoing risk, and perform ongoing system authorizations.

#### People

3.4.1.1 The organization's staff is consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance measures across the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of the organization's ISCM program.

Managed and Measureable

3.4.1.2 Skilled personnel have been hired and/or existing staff trained to develop the appropriate metrics to measure the success of the ISCM program.

Managed and Measureable

Met Staff are assigned responsibilities for developing and monitoring ISCM metrics, as well as updating and revising metrics as needed 3.4.1.3

Managed and Measureable

based on organization risk tolerance, the threat environment, business/mission requirements, and the results of the ISCM program. Met Processes

> Managed and Measureable

The organization has processes for consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance measures across the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of its processes for performing ISCM. Met

> Managed and Measureable

3.4.1.5 Data supporting ISCM metrics are obtained accurately, consistently, and in a reproducible format.

3.4.1.6 The organization is able to integrate metrics on the effectiveness of its ISCM program to deliver persistent situational awareness across the organization, explain the environment from both a threat/vulnerability and risk/impact perspective, and cover mission areas of operations and security domains

Managed and Measureable

Met

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#### Section 3: Detect The organization uses its ISCM metrics for determining risk response actions including risk acceptance, avoidance/rejection, or Managed and transfer. Measureable Met 3.4.1.8 ISCM metrics are reported to the organizational officials charged with correlating and analyzing the metrics in ways that are relevant Managed and for risk management activities. Measureable Met 3.4.1.9 ISCM is used to maintain ongoing authorizations of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate, Managed and including common controls and keep required system information and data (i.e., System Security Plan Risk Assessment Report, Measureable Security Assessment Report, and POA&M) up to date on an ongoing basis. Met Technology 3 4 1.10 The organization uses technologies for consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance Managed and across the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of its technologies for performing ISCM. Measureable 3 4 1.11 The organization's ISCM performance measures include data on the implementation of its ISCM program for all sections of the Managed and network from the implementation of technologies that provide standard calculations, comparisons, and presentations Measureable 3.4.1.12 The organization utilizes a SIEM tool to collect, maintain, monitor, and analyze IT security information, achieve situational awareness, Managed and and manage risk Measureable Met Level 5 Definition In addition to being managed and measurable (Level 4), the organization's ISCM program is institutionalized, repeatable, self-regenerating, and updated in a near real-time basis based on changes in business/mission requirements and a changing threat and technology landscape. People

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			r or Official Ose Offiy		
Sectio	n 3: Detect		5. 4. 367844.64		
3,5.1.1	The organization's assignment of the basis to make any change business/mission requirement.	ges needed to address ISCM re	ssess a high skill level to perform and update sults based on organization risk tolerance, the	ISCM activities on a near real-time e threat environment, and	Optimized
Process	ses				
3.5.1.2	The organization has in Met	stitutionalized a process of con	tinuous improvement incorporating advanced	d cybersecurity and practices	Optimized
3.5.1.3	On a near real-time basic evolving and sophistical Not Met	is, the organization actively ad- ted threats in a timely manner	apts its ISCM program to a changing cybersed	curity landscape and responds to	Optimized
	Comments:	Scans are performed weekly	however the vulnerabilities were not remedia	ted timely.	
5.5,1,4	The ISCM program is for processes, and other mis Met	ully integrated with strategic plassion/business areas, as approp	lanning, enterprise architecture and capital pla riate	anning and investment control	Optimized
.5.1.5	The ISCM program achirisk, and mission impact Met		objectives and goals and influences decision	making that is based on cost,	Optimized
echnol	ogy				
5.1.6	The organization has ins	titutionalized the implementat	ion of advanced cybersecurity technologies in	n near real-time	Optimized
5.1.7	The organization has institutionalized the use of advanced technologies for analysis of trends and performance against benchmarks to continuously improve its ISCM program.  Optimized			Optimized	
	Met				
evel EVEL 4	: Managed and Measureab	le	Score 18	Possible Score	
			10	20	

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#### Section 4: Respond

#### Level 1

#### Definition

4.1.1 Incident response program is not formalized and incident response activities are performed in a reactive manner resulting in an ad-hoc program that does not meet Level 2 requirements for a defined program consistent with FISMA (including guidance from NIST SP 800-83, NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2, NIST SP 800-53, OMB M-16-03, OMB M-16-04, and US-CERT Federal Incident Notification Guidelines).

#### People

4.1 1.1 Incident response team structures/models, stakeholders, and their roles, responsibilities, levels of authority, and dependencies have not been fully defined and communicated across the organization, including the designation of a principal security operations center or equivalent organization that is accountable to agency leadership, DHS, and OMB for all incident response activities.

Ad Hoc

4.1.1.2 The organization has not performed an assessment of the skills, knowledge, and resources needed to effectively implement an incident response program. Key personnel do not possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully implement an effective incident response program.

Ad Hoc

Met

1.1.1.3 The organization has not defined a common threat vector taxonomy and defined how incident response information will be shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities and other stakeholders, and used to make timely, risk-based decisions.

Met

Ad Hoc

4.1.1.4 The organization has not defined how it will integrate incident response activities with organizational risk management, continuous monitoring, continuity of operations, and other mission/business areas, as appropriate.

Ad Hoc

#### Met Processes

Incident response processes have not been fully defined and are performed in an ad-hoc, reactive manner for the following areas: incident response planning, incident response training and testing; incident detection and analysis; incident containment, eradication, and recovery; incident coordination, information sharing, and reporting to internal and external stakeholders using standard data elements and impact classifications within timeframes established by US-CERT.

Ad Hoc

Met

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#### Section 4: Respond The organization has not fully defined how it will collaborate with DHS and other parties, as appropriate, to provide on-site, technical Ad Hoc assistance/surge resources/special capabilities for quickly responding to incidents. Met 4.1.1.7 The organization has not identified and defined the qualitative and quantitative performance measures that will be used to assess the Ad Hoc effectiveness of its incident response program, perform trend analysis, achieve situational awareness, and control ongoing risk. 4.1.1.8 The organization has not defined its processes for collecting and considering lessons learned and incident data to improve security Ad Hoc controls and incident response processes. Met Technology The organization has not identified and defined the incident response technologies needed in one or more of the following areas and Ad Hoc relies on manual/procedural methods in instances where automation would be more effective. Use of incident response technologies in the following areas is ad-hoc. - Web application protections, such as web application firewalls - Event and incident management, such as intrusion detection and prevention tools, and incident tracking and reporting tools - Aggregation and analysis, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products - Malware detection, such as anti-virus and antispam software technologies - Information management, such as data loss prevention - File integrity and endpoint and server security tools 4.1.1.10 The organization has not defined how it will meet the defined Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) security controls and ensure that all Ad Hoc agency traffic, including mobile and cloud, are routed through defined access points, as appropriate 4.1.1.11 The organization has not defined how it plans to utilize DHS' Einstein program for intrusion detection/prevention capabilities for traffic Ad Hoc entering and leaving the organization's networks. Met

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#### Section 4: Respond

4.1.1.12 The organization has not defined how it plans to utilize technology to develop and maintain a baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems.

Ad Hoc

Met

#### Level 2

#### Definition

4.2.1 The organizational has formalized its incident response program through the development of comprehensive incident response policies, plans, and procedures consistent with FISMA (including guidance from NIST SP 800-83, NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2, NIST SP 800-53, OMB M-16-03, OMB M-16-04, and US-CERT Federal Incident Notification Guidelines). However, incident response policies, plans, and procedures are not consistently implemented organization-wide.

#### People

4.2.1.1 Incident response team structures/models, stakeholders, and their roles, responsibilities, levels of authority, and dependencies have been fully defined and communicated across the organization, including the designation of a principal security operations center or equivalent organization that is accountable to agency leadership, DHS, and OMB for all incident response activities. However, stakeholders may not have adequate resources (people, processes, and technology) to effectively implement incident response activities. Further, the organization has not verified roles and responsibilities as part of incident response testing.

Defined

#### Met

4.2.1.2 The organization has performed an assessment of the skills, knowledge, and resources needed to effectively implement an incident response program. In addition, the organization has developed a plan for closing any gaps identified. However, key personnel may still lack the knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully implement an effective incident response program.

Defined

4.2.1.3 The

The organization has defined a common threat vector taxonomy and defined how incident response information will be shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities and other stakeholders, and used to make timely, risk-based decisions. However, the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization does not consistently utilize its theat wester than the organization of the organization o

the organization does not consistently utilize its threat vector taxonomy and incident response information is not always shared with individuals with significant security responsibilities and other stakeholders in a timely manner.

Defined

Met

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#### Section 4: Respond The organization has defined how it will integrate incident response activities with organizational risk management, continuous Defined monitoring, continuity of operations, and other mission/business areas, as appropriate. However, incident response activities are not consistently integrated with these areas. Processes 4.2.1.5 Incident response processes have been fully defined for the following areas: incident response planning, incident response training and Defined testing; incident detection and analysis; incident containment, eradication, and recovery; incident coordination, information sharing, and reporting using standard data elements and impact classifications within timeframes established by US-CERT. However, these processes are inconsistently implemented across the organization. Met 4.2.1.6 The organization has fully defined, but not consistently implemented, its processes to collaborate with DHS and other parties as Defined appropriate, to provide on-site, technical assistance/surge resources/special capabilities for quickly responding to incidents. 4.2.1.7 The organization has identified and defined the qualitative and quantitative performance measures that will be used to assess the Defined effectiveness of its incident response program, perform trend analysis, achieve situational awareness, and control ongoing risk However, these measures are not consistently collected, analyzed, and used across the organization. Met The organization has defined its processes for collecting and considering lessons learned and incident data to improve security Defined controls and incident response processes. However, lessons learned are not consistently captured and shared across the organization and used to make timely improvements to security controls and the incident response program. Technology

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#### Section 4: Respond

4.2.1.9 The organization has identified and fully defined the incident response technologies it plans to utilize in the following areas

Defined

- Web application protections, such as web application firewalls
- Event and incident management, such as intrusion detection and prevention tools, and incident tracking and reporting tools
- Aggregation and analysis, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. However, the organization has not ensured that security and event data are aggregated and correlated from all relevant sources and sensors.
- Malware detection such as Anti-virus and antispam software technologies
- Information management such as data loss prevention
- File integrity and endpoint and server security tools

However, the organization has not fully implemented technologies in these areas and continues to rely on manual/procedural methods in instances where automation would be more effective. In addition, while tools are implemented to support some incident response activities, the tools are not interoperable to the extent practicable, do not cover all components of the organization's network, and/or have not been configured to collect and retain relevant and meaningful data consistent with the organization's incident response policy, plans, and procedures.

Met

4.2.1.10 The organization has defined how it will meet the defined TIC security controls and ensure that all agency traffic, including mobile and cloud, are routed through defined access points, as appropriate However, the organization has not ensured that the TIC 2.0 provider and agency managed capabilities are consistently implemented.

Defined

Met

4.2.1.11 The organization has defined how it plans to utilize DHS' Einstein program for intrusion detection/prevention capabilities for traffic entering and leaving its networks.

Defined

Met

4.2.1.12 The organization has defined how it plans to utilize technology to develop and maintain a baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems. However, the organization has not established, and does not consistently maintain, a comprehensive baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems.

Defined

Met

Level 3
Definition

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#### Section 4: Respond

4.3.1 In addition to the formalization and definition of its incident response program (Level 2), the organization consistently implements its incident response program across the agency, in accordance with FISMA (including guidance from NIST SP 800-83, NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2, NIST SP 800-53, OMB M-16-03, OMB M-16-04, and US-CERT Federal Incident Notification Guidelines). However, data supporting metrics on the effectiveness of the incident response program across the organization are not verified, analyzed, and correlated

#### People

4.3.1.1 Incident response team structures/models, stakeholders, and their roles, responsibilities, levels of authority, and dependencies have been fully defined, communicated, and consistently implemented across the organization (Level 2). Further, the organization has verified roles and responsibilities of incident response stakeholders as part of incident response testing.

Consistently Implemented

4.3.1.2 The organization has fully implemented its plans to close any gaps in the skills, knowledge, and resources needed to effectively implement its incident response program. Incident response teams are periodically trained to ensure that knowledge, skills, and abilities are maintained.

Consistently Implemented

Met

Met

Met

4.3.1.3 The organization consistently utilizes its defined threat vector taxonomy and shares information with individuals with significant security responsibilities and other stakeholders in a timely fashion to support risk-based decision making.

Consistently Implemented

4.3.1.4 Incident response activities are integrated with organizational risk management, continuous monitoring, continuity of operations, and other mission/business areas, as appropriate.

Consistently Implemented

Met

#### Processes

Incident response processes are consistently implemented across the organization for the following areas: incident response planning, incident response training and testing; incident detection and analysis; incident containment, eradication, and recovery; incident coordination, information sharing, and reporting using standard data elements and impact classifications within timeframes established by US-CERT.

Consistently Implemented

Met

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#### Section 4: Respond 4.3.1.6 The organization has ensured that processes to collaborate with DHS and other parties as appropriate, to provide on-site, technical Consistently assistance/surge resources/special capabilities for quickly responding to incidents are implemented consistently across the Implemented organization. Met 4.3.1.7 The organization is consistently capturing qualitative and quantitative performance metrics on the performance of its incident response Consistently program. However, the organization has not ensured that the data supporting the metrics was obtained accurately and in a Implemented reproducible format or that the data is analyzed and correlated in ways that are effective for risk management. Met 4.3.1.8 The organization is consistently collecting and capturing lessons learned and incident data on the effectiveness of its incident response Consistently program and activities. However, lessons learned may not be shared across the organization in a timely manner and used to make Implemented timely improvements to the incident response program and security measures. Met The rigor, intensity, scope, and results of incident response activities (i.e. preparation, detection, analysis, containment, eradication, Consistently and recovery, reporting and post incident) are comparable and predictable across the organization Implemented Met Technology 4.3.1.10 The organization has consistently implemented its defined incident response technologies in the following areas Consistently - Web application protections, such as web application firewalls Implemented - Event and incident management, such as intrusion detection and prevention tools, and incident tracking and reporting tools - Aggregation and analysis, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. The organization ensures that security and event data are aggregated and correlated from all relevant sources and sensors - Malware detection, such as anti-virus and antispam software technologies - Information management, such as data loss prevention - File integrity and endpoint and server security tools In addition, the tools are interoperable to the extent practicable, cover all components of the organization's network, and have been configured to collect and retain relevant and meaningful data consistent with the organization's incident response policy, procedures, and plans. Met

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#### Section 4: Respond 4.3.1.11 The organization has consistently implemented defined TIC security controls and implemented actions to ensure that all agency traffic, Consistently including mobile and cloud, are routed through defined access points, as appropriate. Implemented 4 3.1.12 The organization is utilizing DHS' Einstein program for intrusion detection/prevention capabilities for traffic entering and leaving their Consistently networks. Implemented 4.3.1.13 The organization has fully implemented technologies to develop and maintain a baseline of network operations and expected data Consistently flows for users and systems. Implemented Level 4 Definition In addition to being consistently implemented (Level 3), incident response activities are repeatable and metrics are used to measure and manage the implementation of the incident response program, achieve situational awareness, and control ongoing risk. In addition, the incident response program adapts to new requirements and government-wide priorities. People Incident response stakeholders are consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance Managed and measures across the organization and are collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of the organization's incident Measureable response program. 4.4.1.2 Skilled personnel have been hired and/or existing staff trained to develop the appropriate metrics to measure the success of the Managed and incident response program. Measureable Met 4.4.1.3 Incident response stakeholders are assigned responsibilities for developing and monitoring incident response metrics, as well as Managed and updating and revising metrics as needed based on organization risk tolerance, the threat environment, business/mission requirements, Measureable and the results of the incident response program. Met **Processes** OIG Report - Annual 2016 Page 27 of 33 For Official Use Only

: Respond	
The organization has processes for consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance measures across the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of its processes for performing accident response.	Managed and Measureable
Data supporting incident response measures and metrics are obtained accurately, consistently, and in a reproducible format	Managed and Measureable
ncident response data, measures, and metrics are analyzed, collected, and presented using standard calculations, comparisons, and resentations  Met	Managed and Measureable
ncident response metrics are reported to organizational officials charged with correlating and analyzing the metrics in ways that are elevant for risk management activities.  Met	Managed and Measureable
<b>y</b>	
the organization uses technologies for consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance cross the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of its technologies for performing incident esponse activities.	Managed and Measureable
he organization's incident response performance measures include data on the implementation of its incident response program for I sections of the network.  Iet	Managed and Measureable
In addition to being managed and measurable (Level 4), the organization's incident response program is institutionalized, repeatable, self-regenerating, and updated in a near real-time basis based on changes in business/mission requirements, and a changing threat and technology landscape.	
	he organization has processes for consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance heasures across the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of its processes for performing acident response.  Act  ata supporting incident response measures and metrics are obtained accurately, consistently, and in a reproducible format  for  cident response data, measures, and metrics are analyzed, collected, and presented using standard calculations, comparisons, and resentations  for  fiet  cident response metrics are reported to organizational officials charged with correlating and analyzing the metrics in ways that are  levant for risk management activities.  for  the organization uses technologies for consistently implementing, monitoring, and analyzing qualitative and quantitative performance ross the organization and is collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the effectiveness of its technologies for performing incident sponse activities.  for  the organization's incident response performance measures include data on the implementation of its incident response program for sections of the network.  In addition to being managed and measurable (Level 4), the organization's incident response program is institutionalized, repeatable, self-regenerating, and updated in a near real-time basis based on changes in business/mission requirements, and

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Sectio	n 4: Respond		Parting the second	4798 BB 12898
4.5.1.1	The organization's assigned personnel collectively po near real-time basis to make any changes needed to ac environment, and business/mission requirements. Met	ssess a high skill level to perform and update iddress incident response results based on organ	ncident response activities on a nization risk tolerance, the threat	Optimized
Process	ses			
4.5.1.2	The organization has institutionalized a process of con Met	ntinuous improvement incorporating advanced	cybersecurity practices	Optimized
4.5.1.3	On a near real-time basis, the organization actively ad responds to evolving and sophisticated threats in a near <b>Met</b>	lapts its incident response program to a changing ar real-time manner.	ng cybersecurity landscape and	Optimized
4.5.1.4	The incident response program is fully integrated with operations, and other mission/business areas, as appro Met		monitoring, continuity of	Optimized
4.5.1.5	The incident response program achieves cost-effective on cost, risk, and mission impact.  Met	e IT security objectives and goals and influence	es decision making that is based	Optimized
<b>Fechnol</b>	logy			
1.5.1.6	The organization has institutionalized the implemental Met	tion of advanced incident response technologie	s in near real-time	Optimized
1.5.1.7	The organization has institutionalized the use of advar continuously improve its incident response program Met	nced technologies for analysis of trends and per	formance against benchmarks to	Optimized
.5.1.8	The organization uses simulation based technologies to assets and adjusts incident response processes and secondet	o continuously determine the impact of potenti urity measures accordingly.	al security incidents to its IT	Optimized
Level		Score	Possible Score	
LEVEL 5	i: Optimized	20	20	

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Cont	ingency P	lanning (Recover)		
5.1	Has the organization established an enterprise-wide business continuity/disaster recovery program, including policies and procedures consistent with FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines?			
	Met			
	5.1.1	Develops and facilitates recovery testing, training, and exercise (TT&E) programs. (FCD1, NIST SP 800-34, NIST SP 800-53)	Consistently Implemented	
		Met	-	
	5.1.2	Incorporates the system's Business Impact Analysis and Business Process Analysis into analysis and strategy toward development of the organization's Continuity of Operations Plan, Business Continuity Plan (BCP), and Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). (NIST SP 800-34)  Met	Consistently Implemented	
	5.1.3	Develops and maintains documented recovery strategies, plans, and procedures at the division, component, and IT infrastructure levels. (NIST SP 800-34)  Met	Consistently Implemented	
	5.1.4	BCP and DRP are in place and ready to be executed upon if necessary (FCD1, NIST SP 800-34, 2016 CIO FISMA Metrics 5.3, PMC)  Met	Consistently Implemented	
	5.1.5	Tests BCP and DRP for effectiveness and updates plans as necessary. (2016 CIO FISMA Metrics, 5.4)  Met	Managed and Measureable	
	5.1.6	Tests system-specific contingency plans, in accordance with organizationally defined timeframes, to determine the	Consistently	

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5.1.7

Met

Section 5: Recover

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Implemented

Managed and

Measureable

effectiveness of the plans as well as readiness to execute the plans if necessary. (NIST SP 800-53: CP-4)

improve contingency/disaster recovery processes (FCD1, NIST SP 800-34)

Develops after-action reports that address issues identified during contingency/disaster recovery exercises in order to

#### Section 5: Recover

Determines alternate processing and storage sites based upon risk assessments which ensure the potential disruption of the organization's ability to initiate and sustain operations is minimized, and are not subject to the same physical and/or cybersecurity risks as the primary sites. (FCD1, NIST SP 800-34, NIST SP 800-53: CP-6, CP-7)

Consistently Implemented

Mat

5.1.9 Conducts backups of information at the user- and system-levels and protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage sites. (FCD1, NIST SP 800-34, NIST SP 800-53: CP-9, NIST CF, PR.IP-4, NARA guidance on information systems security records)

Managed and Measureable

Met

5.1.10 Contingency planning that considers supply chain threats.

Defined

Met

5.1.11 Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization's Contingency Planning Program that was not noted in the questions above. Based on all testing performed is the Contingency Planning Program effective?

Effective

Level	Score	Possible Score	
LEVEL 5: Optimized	20	20	

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#### APPENDIX A: Maturity Model Scoring

Maturity Levels by Section

Level	Score	Possible Score
LEVEL 3: Consistently Implemented	13	20
LEVEL 3: Consistently Implemented	13	20
LEVEL 4: Managed and Measureable	18	20
LEVEL 5: Optimized	20	20
LEVEL 5: Optimized	20	20
	84	100
	LEVEL 3: Consistently Implemented  LEVEL 3: Consistently Implemented  LEVEL 4: Managed and Measureable  LEVEL 5: Optimized	LEVEL 3: Consistently Implemented   13

Section 1: Identify

Model Indicator	Vlet	Not Met	Iotal	0/0	Points Assigned	Possible Points
Ad-Hoc	0	0	0	100%	3	3
Defined	4	0	4	100%	4	4
Consistently Implemented	10	1	11	91%	6	6
Managed and Measureable	6	0	6	100%	0	5
Optimized	0	0	0	100%	0	2

#### Section 2: Protect

Model Indicator	Met	Not Met	Total	0/0	Points Assigned	Possible Points
Ad-Hoc	0	0	0	100%	3	3
Defined	5	0	5	100%	4	4
Consistently Implemented	17	1	18	94%	6	6
Managed and Measureable	7	1 1	8	88%	0	5
Optimized	0	0	0	100%	0	2

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#### Section 3: Detect

Met	Not Met	Total	0/0	Points Assigned	Possible Points		
10	0	10	100%	3	3		
10	0	10	100%	4	4		
10	0	10	100%	6	6		
12	0	12	100%	5	5		
6	1	7	86%	0	2		
	10 10 10	10 0 10 0 10 0	10 0 10 10 0 10 10 0 10	10         0         10         100%           10         0         10         100%           10         0         10         100%           12         0         12         100%	10     0     10     100%     3       10     0     10     100%     4       10     0     10     100%     6       12     0     12     100%     5		

Section 4: Respond

Section 4. Respond							
Model Indicator	Met	Not Met	Total	176	Points Assigned	Possible Points	
Ad-Hoc	12	0	12	100%	3	3	
Defined	12	0	12	100%	4	4	
Consistently Implemented	13	0	13	100%	6	6	
Managed and Measureable	9	0	9	100%	5	5	
Optimized	8	0	8	100%	2	2	

#### Section 5: Recover

Section 5. Recover							
Model Indicator	Met	Not Met	Total	0/0	Points Assigned	Possible Points	
Ad-Hoc	0	0	0	100%	3	3	
Defined	2	0	2	100%	4	4	
Consistently Implemented	6	0	6	100%	6	6	
Managed and Measureable	3	0	3	100%	5	5	
Optimized	0	0	0	100%	2	2	
		EFFF	CTIVE	10070			

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# Appendix 4 Report Distribution

#### Federal Labor Relations Authority

Ernest DuBester, Member Patrick Pizzella, Member Sarah Whittle Spooner, Executive Director Michael Jeffries, Chief Information Officer Fred Jacob, Solictor

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FISMA Evaluation